

## Message Text

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ACTION AF-06

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ARA-06 AID-05 IO-11 ACDA-05 MC-02

OMB-01 DHA-02 EB-07 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06

/104 W

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P R 081300Z MAR 76

FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6857

INFO AMEMBASSY LUAKA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PRETORIA

AMCONGEN CAPETOWN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY BONN

C O N F I D E N T I A L KINSHASA 2012

CEPTETOWN FOR EMBASSY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UR, CG

SUBJECT: GOZ MOVES CAUTIOUSLY TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH  
SOVIETS, CUBANS

1. SUMMARY: DURING REVIEW OF POST-ANGOLA DEVELOPMENTS  
MARCH 6, FOREIGN MINISTER NGUZA INDICATED ZAIRE IS TAKING  
STEPS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH SOVIETS AND CUBANS.HE  
MADE CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT GOZ REMAINS WARY OF SOVIET  
INTENTIONS, WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR REMOVAL OF  
SOVIET/CUBAN FORCES FROM ANGOLA, AND VIEWS MASSIVE ARMS  
BUILD-UP IN ANGOLA--EVEN IF LEFT SOLELY IN HANDS OF MPLA--  
AS POSING CONTINUING THREAT TO ZAIRE'S SECURITY. END  
SUMMARY.

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2. NGUZA SAID HE WANTED ME TO KNOW THAT DAY BEFORE HE HAD CALLED IN AND OTHER WARSAW PACT REPS, AS WELL AS SOVIETS/CUBANS, TO DISCUSS RELATIONS IN THE WAKE OF MOBUTU-NETO ACCOMODATION. HE HAD INFORMED THEM THAT GOZ WAS ENDING FOUR-MONTH PROHIBITION ON THEIR TRAVEL OUTSIDE KINSHASA. NGUZA SAID AT SAME TIME HE HAD WARNED SOVIETS AGAINST TAKING ANY ACTIONS INIMICAL TO ZAIRE'S SECURITY AND, IN THIS CONTEXT, HAD SAID THAT THE SOONER THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS LEAVE ANGOLA THE BETTER. SOVIET AMBASSADOR LAVROV HAD RESPONDED TO LATTER PITCH BY SIMPLY "TAKING NOTE" OF IT. HE HAD GONE ON, HOWEVER, TO PROFESS MOSCOW'S DESIRE TO RESTORE FRIENDLY RELATIONS, MENTIONING IN THIS CONNECTION THE POSSIBILITY OF NEW SOVIET "INVESTMENTS" IN ZAIRE AND MORE TRAINING FOR ZAIRIAN STUDENTS. NGUZA SAID IT WAS EVIDENT SOVIETS ARE WORRIED ABOUT EFFECT OF THEIR INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA ON THEIR RELATIONS WITH OTHER AFRICAN STATES, HE SUSPECTED THAT FOR THAT REASON SOVIETS HAD ENCOURAGED NETO TO COME TO TERMS QUICKLY WITH MOBUTU.

3. AS FOR CUBANS, NGUZA SAID CUBAN AMBASSADOR'S RESPONSE TO HIS POINT ABOUT GETTING OUT OF ANGOLA SOON HAD BEEN THAT "OTHER AFRICAN FRIENDS" HAD ASKED FOR CUBA'S HELP. NGUZA INTERPRETED THIS AS FURTHER INDICATION THAT CUBANS INTEND TO KEEP THEIR FORCES AROUND FOR USE NOT ONLY AGAINST SOUTH AFRICANS IN ANGOLA BUT PROBABLY IN RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA AS WELL. HERE HE REITERATED ZAIRE'S POSITION THAT, WHILE FEARING SPREAD OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN AFRICA, GOZ COULD NOT BE PLACED IN POSTURE OF ACTIVELY OPPOSING EFFORTS TO LIBERATE AREAS UNDER CONTROL OF WHITE MINORITY REGIMES.

4. HAVING SAID ALL THIS, NGUZA WENT ON TO STRESS THE POINT THAT GOZ STILL HAD NO CONFIDENCE IN SOVIET INTENTIONS AND VIEWED THE OVER-ALL THREAT TO ZAIRE'S SECURITY AS IN NO WAY DIMINISHED BY RECENT MOVES TOWARD ACCOMMODATION. EVEN IF THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS WITHDREW FROM ANGOLA, THE HUGE STORE OF SOPHISTICATED ARMS LEFT IN THE HANDS OF THE MPLA--TOGETHER WITH INCREASED ARMS INCLUDING MIGS ACROSS THE RIVER IN CONGO--MEANT THAT ZAIRE WAS STILL SERIOUSLY THREATENED AND IN NEED OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE.

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5. ON OTHER POINTS, NGUZA REAFFIRMED GOZ'S INTENTION TO WITHHOLD DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION OF MPLA GOVERNMENT PENDING SATISFACTORY PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING TERMS OF BRAZZAVILLE ACCORD. GOZ, FOR ITS PART, WAS MOVING AHEAD ON IMPLEMENTATION, CLOSING DOWN FNLA HEADQUARTERS IN KINSHASA AND PROHIBITING BOTH FNLA AND FLEC (CABINDA) FROM HENCEFORTH USING ZAIRE FOR PROPAGANDA AND OTHER OVERT POLITICAL ACTIVITIES. NGUZA ALSO CONFIRMED THAT, WHEREAS GOZ HAD

OBLIGATION TO ENCOURAGE ANGOLANS IN ZAIRE TO RETURN HOME,  
GOZ WOULD NOT FORCE BACK ANY WHO CHOSE TO REMAIN AS  
REFUGEES.

6. COMMENT: GOZ DECISION TO START THAWING ITS RELATIONS  
WITH SOVIETS AND CUBANS IS LOGICAL AFTERMATH OF ACCOMMODATION  
WITH ANGOLA AND IN KEEPIN WITH MOBUTU'S LONG-STANDING  
POLICY OF KEEPING ALL OPTIONS OPEN. MOREOVER, MOBUTU  
PROBABLY SEES POLITICAL ADVANTAGE IN IMPROVING RELATIONS  
WITH TWO COUNTRIES WHICH, WHATEVER THEY MAY HAVE DONE IN  
ANGOLA, IN FUTURE MAY BE VIEWED BY AFRICANS AS LEADERS IN  
FIGHT TO LIBERATE SOUTHERN AFRICA. I DOUBT THAT, FOR THE  
TIME BEING AT LEAST, MOBUTU WILL GO MUCH FURTHER THAN  
RESTORING RELATIONS WITH SOVIETS TO "CORRECT" BASIS.  
WHETER, AND TO WHAT EXTENT, HE WILL FEEL OBLIGED TO  
CONSIDER GOING BEYOND THAT WILL DEPEND IN LARGE MEASURE  
ON RESONSES FROM US AND OTHER WESTERN FRIENDS TO HIS  
PERCEIVED NEEDS IN BOTH THE ECONOMIC/FINANCIAL AND SECURITY  
FIELDS. CUTLER

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